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Abstract
The purpose of this Essay is to examine the machinery for providing evidence to defendants in
foreign proceedings and the extent to which there is equality of arms and opportunity between the
prosecutor and defendant when obtaining evidence from abroad in U.K. proceedings. This Essay
will also identify the new problems that are starting to emerge when such equality is threatened. To
do so, it explores the mechanism by which mutual assistance is governed in the United Kingdom
- the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act of 1990.
DEFENSE REQUESTS FOR INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: THE
U.K. PERSPECTIVE
Christopher Murray*
Toward the end of the last century, U.S. boxing promoter
Don King was charged before a U.S. court with wire fraud. On a
re-trial, at the request of the defense, the trial judge sent a letter
rogatory to the United Kingdom for the production of docu-
ments, comprising of contingency/non-appearance policies is-
sued by a Lloyds syndicate after January 1, 1985. The relevance
of these policies concerned an allegation that Don King had
fraudulently made claims under insurance policies when a par-
ticipant in a boxing match, promoted by him, had sustained in-
jury in the course of training and had thus been unable to ap-
pear at the scheduled fight.
The U.S. prosecutor had produced evidence as to the inter-
pretation of a specific term within the policy, and Don King's
U.S. lawyers sought to obtain evidence to contradict the asserted
interpretation. Accordingly, they wished to look at all previous
policies brokered by the same broker in order to discover
whether, in previous policies, different definitions had been
adopted. Ultimately, the U.S. defense attorneys hoped to find
that, in relation to claims under policies, the appropriate term
had been interpreted contrary to the assertions of the prosecu-
tion witnesses.
The defense request, made by the U.S. judge, was exceed-
ingly broad. It was transmitted, however, to the United King-
dom to deal with under its Criminal Justice (International Co-
operation) Act of 1990 (or "1990 Act").' In due course, the U.K.
Secretary of State nominated Bow Street Magistrates' Court to
process the request and, as the U.K. statute requires, "to receive
such of the evidence to which the request relates as may appear
to the court to be appropriate for the purpose of giving event to
the request."2
* Partner, Head of Criminal Law, Kingsley & Napley, Solicitors, London, United
Kingdom.
1. CriminalJustice (International Co-operation) Act, 1990, [hereinafter 1990 Act].
2. Id. § 4(2).
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The existence of such judicial machinery underlines the im-
portance of international judicial assistance in criminal matters
as a relatively recent phenomenon. As little as half a century
ago, when a crime was committed, the resultant investigation was
nearly always confined within the jurisdiction where the crime
had occurred. For the most part, investigative trails, however
complex, could be followed without needing to look outside the
country for evidence. This was as true for the defense lawyer as
for the prosecutor or investigator.
In the past, those who committed offenses neither leave the
jurisdiction themselves, nor did they leave any evidential trail be-
yond the limits of their own country. An international dimen-
sion for criminal investigations was predominately unnecessary.
To leave the immediate area of the commission of the offense
would have been, in many cases, as far as the potential defendant
would have had to go to ensure that detection would at least be
difficult.
International travel fifty years ago was relatively uncommon
and certainly less accessible than today. Journeys that were then
almost unimaginable are accepted today as routine. Not only is
international travel itself easier today but, in addition, the for-
malities also required to cross national boundaries are constantly
being reduced. Border crossing points and visa controls were at
one time able to provide, at least in part, a trail of movements,
but these are now at a minimum in many countries. Within the
domain of the European Union, Article 2(1) of the 1990 Con-
vention implementing the Schengen Agreement of June 14,
1985 (or "1990 Convention"), states that, "[i]nternal borders
may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being
carried out."' For the thirteen Member States to which the 1990
Convention applies (all Member States of the European Union,
with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland), its ef-
fect is to create an almost frontierless zone.
If this is the case for the movement of people, then the
same can also be said about the movements of money and finan-
cial transactions. While international trade and commercial ac-
tivity have been long established, the means by which they now
transpire are much less laborious than previously done, and, as a
result, much faster. The development of international comput-
3. Convention for Implementation of the Schengen Agreement, 1990, art. 2(1).
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erized transactions and electronic transfers of funds have revolu-
tionized the concept of international trade and finance. Trans-
actions that formerly were accomplished in days, or even weeks,
now take seconds. Funds move from country to country and
continent to continent at the press of a button. The develop-
ment of the Internet as a global communication system has also
had its effect. Increases in the rate of its use and in the diversity
of purposes for which it is used similarly affect international
commercial transactions.
The average citizen may hardly be aware of the effects these
developments have had on his or her everyday life, but the crimi-
nal has adapted techniques to take advantage of them. The
criminal knows that a transaction that takes seconds to per-
form-moving funds from one jurisdiction to another-will take
investigators months, if not years, to unravel. A multinational
conspiracy, with participants and witnesses from several different
states, will increase the complexity for the investigator.
Informal police cooperation is almost as old as individual
police forces. However, formal judicial cooperation, which will
usually be necessary to obtain evidence in admissible form, is a
relatively recent phenomenon and is unable to keep up with the
activities it seeks to investigate. For modern criminal investiga-
tions to be effective and expeditious, it is essential that, as far as
possible, international boundaries cause as few problems for in-
vestigators as they do for criminals. National boundaries still cre-
ate a natural limit to the territorial activities of national law en-
forcement forces, although the provisions of the 1990 Conven-
tion authorize police officers of Member States with limited
powers of hot pursuit of criminal suspects across international
borders.4
International cooperation in criminal investigations has be-
come increasingly important for practitioners-both for prose-
cutors and defense lawyers. It is not just in complex cases that
there is a need for effective cooperation. Even the most appar-
ently simple case involving, for instance, a minor road traffic ac-
cident, may involve witnesses or accused persons from ajurisdic-
tion other than the one in which the accident occurred. Wit-
nesses from abroad may need to be summoned to court, official
papers will need to be served, the evidence concerning witnesses
4. Id. art. 41.
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may need to be obtained. In more complex cases, where, for
example, there is a need to unravel a complex trail of financial
dealings across many countries and perhaps several continents,
an effective system of mutual legal assistance is essential for ex-
peditious and effective investigation and prosecution of cases.
In all such cases, the defense also may wish to obtain evidence
from another jurisdiction in order to present their case properly.
If the system of international judicial cooperation either
fails to operate effectively, or is perceived to operate ineffec-
tively, then not only will international criminal activity continue
unchecked, but the system of criminal justice in that country will
also be brought into disrepute. Already, organized international
criminal activity operates on a scale that dwarfs the economic
output of some countries. Governments must urgently take what
steps they can to enable effective international cooperative ef-
forts to battle this threat.
The growth of international crime and the recognition of
the threat it poses to civilized society, particularly in its organ-
ized form, is seen as one of the most important items on the
current international political agenda. There is a danger that
this need for increased collaboration is perceived only to be a
prosecutorial necessity. It is equally important, however, that the
rights of the defendant are similarly recognized. Adequate and
efficient judicial cooperation must be equally available to an ac-
cused.
Many of those reading this Essay will be familiar with the
film In the Name of the FatherP and the miscarriage ofjustice with
which it was concerned. It was, unhappily, only one of several
prosecutions conducted in the United Kingdom in the 1970s,
many of them linked to terrorism (but not solely), where evi-
dence of crucial value to defendants, which had been collected
by the police during the course of the investigation, was deliber-
ately withheld. In one dramatic example, a man was wrongly
convicted of a sexual murder of a young girl and sentenced to
life imprisonment. The police had deliberately withheld evi-
dence that the defendant was physically incapable of producing
semen. The prosecution relied on the presence of semen on the
body as proof of his guilt.
This threw into sharp relief the need for U.K. officials to
5. IN THE NANI OF THE FATHER (Gabriel Byrne 1993).
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examine the whole question of the duty of the prosecution to
make disclosures. A Royal Commission was appointed to do so.
Fundamental to the problem was the unavoidable inequality of
arms in any investigation; the police, particularly in the high pro-
file cases, have enormous investigative resources available to
them. Only in relatively few cases will the defendant be suffi-
ciently wealthy to match such resources. A thorough investiga-
ton will turn up evidence of assistance to a suspect; sometimes
that evidence will indicate or even confirm innocence. Without
effective duties on the prosecutor to disclose, the inequality of
arms will widen.
Steps, albeit inadequate (as evidenced by the recent con-
cern expressed by our Director of Public Prosecutions), have
been taken to seek to ensure that proper disclosure does occur.
In a sense, the investigative resources of the police are made
available (to a very limited degree) to the defendant. Of more
practical importance, the prosecutor now has a duty to pursue
all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether they point towards or
away from the accused.
The purpose of this Essay is to examine the machinery for
providing evidence to defendants in foreign proceedings and
the extent to which there is equality of arms and opportunity
between the prosecutor and defendant when obtaining evidence
from abroad in U.K. proceedings. This Essay will also identify
the new problems that are starting to emerge when such equality
is threatened. To do so, one must explore the mechanism by
which mutual assistance is governed in the United Kingdom-
the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act of 1990.6
I. INCOMING REQUESTS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
FOR EVIDENCE
Section 4 of the 1990 Act governs the applications by non-
domestic authorities for evidence to be obtained in the United
Kingdom.7 For a request to be executed under this Section, it
must be received by the Home Secretary from a court or tribunal
exercising criminal jurisdiction in the requesting State, or a pros-
ecuting authority in that State or from any other authority in
that State which appears to the Secretary of State to have the
6. 1990 Act, supra note 1.
7. Id. § 4.
function of making requests of the kind to which Section 4 ap-
plies. 8 It is the responsibility of the Mutual Legal Assistance Sec-
tion in the U.K. Home Office to ensure that this precondition is
fulfilled.
The Home Secretary must also be satisfied:
(i) that an offense under the law of the requesting State has been
committed or that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that such an offense has been committed; and
(ii) that proceedings in respect of that offense have been instituted
in the requesting State or that an investigation into that of-
fense is being carried on there.
Having satisfied himself of the matters contained in Section
4(2), the Secretary of State thereafter has discretion. If he
thinks fit, then he may by notice in writing nominate a court to
receive any eidence that the court deems relevant and appropri-
ate to fulfill the request.
If the evidence is particularly complicated or appears to in-
volve complex questions of law, then the U.K. Home Secretary
may nominate a Crown Court or the High Court to hear the
evidence requested. When a court has been nominated by the
U.K. Secretary of State, it will be the responsibility of that court
to execute the request. This will usually involve cooperation
with the court police liaison officer, who will make inquiries as to
the whereabouts of the witnesses and arrange for their appear-
ance in court. If a witness is willing, then a witness summons
(subpoena) will not be necessary. If the witness is unwilling, or if
he or she requires a court order, for example to produce busi-
ness records or other confidential material, then a witness sum-
mons may be issued by the court under Paragraph 1 of Schedule
1 of the 1990 Act to secure his attendance at courtY
Where the witness is willing and cooperative, the police may
be able to agree with the witness, before the court hearing, to
take a statement setting out the main matters to be dealt with in
his or her statement. Therefore, the court hearing may involve
no more than a formal adoption in court under oath of the po-
lice statement. Provision is made under Paragraph 2 of Sched-
ule 1 of the 1990 Act for the proceedings in the court to be
8. Id.
9. Id. Schedule 1(2).
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under oath. 10
II. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NOMINATED COURT
Proceedings before the nominated court are regulated by
rules," which provide that the court may, if it thinks necessary in
the interest of justice, direct that the public be excluded from
the court. The rules also provide that the power to exclude the
public supplements and that it is without prejudice to any other
powers of the court to hear proceedings in camera.
If the letter of request has included an entreaty that repre-
sentatives of the requesting authority or representatives of the
defense from the requesting state be present during the taking
of the witness's evidence, then this request will be acceded to, so
far as possible, in the execution of the request. If, however, it is
impossible to arrange a court hearing for the witness at a time
that suits the international representatives, then the hearing may
need to proceed in the absence of those representatives. Under
such circumstances, it would be made clear to the requesting
authorities that their request could not be executed in full. The
court rules under the 1990 Act impose a duty on the clerk of the
court to make a note of the proceedings, and in particular, to
record:
i) which persons with an interest in the proceedings were
present;
ii) which of the said persons were represented and by
whom;
iii) whether any of the said persons were denied the oppor-
tunity to cross examine a witness as to any part of his or
her testimony.' 2
The Home Secretary is entitled to request a copy of this record
of proceedings.
In R v. Bow Street Magistrates' Court, ex parte Zardari3 (which
related to Benizir Bhutto's husband), Justice Latham indicated
that the court's discretion is, as set out in Section 4(2) (b) of the
10. Id. Schedule 2(1).
11. The Magistrates Courts (Criminal justice (International Co-operation)) S.R. &
0. 1991; Crown Court Amendment S.R. & 0. 1991.
12. Id.
13. R v. Bow Street Magistrates' Court, ex parte Zardari, Unreported CO/1593/98
(Q.B. 1998).
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1990 Act, to receive such of the evidence to which the request
relates "as may appear to the court to be appropriate."' 4 Justice
Latham added that, "the statute does not envisage the court hav-
ing any other discretion than that identified in the subsection."1 5
Thus, in the Zardari case, the question of whether the assertions
made by the requesting state (Pakistan) were fraudulent is not a
matter for the discretion of the nominated court, but rather for
the Home Secretary. The court in Zardari thereby rejected a
claim that the proceedings had been brought as an abuse of its
process.
Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 of the 1990 Act empowers the
court to compel witnesses to attend court or to produce docu-
ments in the same way as for other proceedings before the court.
Furthermore, under Paragraph 2, the court may admit evidence
given under oath during the proceedings.
International requests for evidence are often made under
the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Crimi-
nal Matters. 6 Under Article 3, however, the United Kingdom
reserved the right not to hear the evidence of witnesses or re-
quire the production of records and other documents when
U.K. law recognized an exemption from giving evidence. Exam-
ples of such exemptions include privilege and non-compel-
lability.
The non-compellability of witnesses with respect to evidence
that they may be called on to give before nominated courts is
covered by Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1990 Act. This par-
agraph provides that:
(1) A person shall not be compelled to give in the proceed-
ings any evidence which he could not be compelled to
give-
(a) in criminal proceedings in the part of the United
Kingdom in which the nominated court exercises ju-
risdiction; or
(b) subject to subparagraph (2) below, in criminal pro-
ceedings in the country or territory from which the
request for the evidence has come. 1
7
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr. 20,
1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185
17. 1990 Act, supra note 1, Schedule 1(4).
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The normal heads of non-compellability will apply-includ-
ing the privileges against self-incrimination and disclosure of
communications between professional legal advisers and their
clients (legal professional privilege), double jeopardy, and the
privilege of sovereign/diplomatic immunity. I was involved in
an interesting Italian defense request in which the Central Crim-
inal Court (the Old Bailey) was nominated' and which turned
upon at least three heads of non-compellability! D, ajersey resi-
dent, had plead guilty in Jersey to various offenses some years
previously, including one charge of forgery. In the course of his
police interview by the Jersey Fraud Squad, D implicated P, a
Swiss citizen in the forgery offense. The forged documents,
which were manufactured by D in Jersey, had allegedly been
presented before an Italian court as part of the defense of a de-
fendant in one of the Banco Ambrosiano trials. An Italian exam-
ining magistrate brought proceedings in Italy against D, P, and
others responsible for introducing the allegedly forged docu-
ments into the earlier proceedings. D was in fact serving a sen-
tence of imprisonment for the Jersey offenses (including that of
forgery) in the United Kingdom. In its defense request, the Ital-
ian magistrate sought to have D provide evidence to the Central
Criminal Court for use in the Italian proceedings to which D was
also a party. P wished to cross examine D upon his assertions. D
was allowed by the Central Criminal Court to refuse to give evi-
dence, on the grounds of autrefois convict (ne bis in idem), that
answers given by him might tend to incriminate him, and finally,
that as a co-defendant he was thereby non-compellable.
While these heads may present anticipated practical obsta-
cles for the defendant making a mutual assistance request to
clear, the most common hurdle will be that which confronted
Don King-the unwilling witness. While one can take a horse to
water, one cannot make him drink. Without care the horse may
stumble at the last fence-the requirement of admissibility. The
standard procedure whereby nominated courts obtain the evi-
dence sought under Section 4 of the 1990 Act is (in the absence
of voluntary testimony) to issue a witness summons or subpoena
directed to a third party.
18. Application under the Criminal justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990
re Christopher Delaney, Central Criminal Court 1 October 1996 - unreported.
III. THZE MEANING OF "EVDENCE"
The proper approach to be followed when considering an
application for the production of documents from a third party
to criminal proceedings is most conveniently set out in the
judgement of Simon Brown, LJ (as approved subsequently by the
House of Lords) in R v. Reading Justices ex parte Berkshire County
Council.9 After reviewing the authorities, Simon Brown, LJ as-
serted that:
The central principles to be derived from those authorities
are as follows:
(i) To be material evidence, documents must be not
only relevant to the issues arising in the criminal
proceedings, but also documents admissible as such
in evidence;
(ii) Documents which are desired merely for the pur-
pose of possible cross-examination are not admissi-
ble in evidence and, thus, are not material for the
purposes of s 97;
(iii) Whoever seeks production of documents must sat-
isfy the justices with some material that the docu-
ments are 'likely to be material' in the sense indi-
cated, likelihood for this purpose involving a real
possibility, although not necessarily a probability;
(iv) It is not sufficient that the applicant merely wants to
find out whether or not the third party has such ma-
terial documents. This procedure must not be used
as a disguised attempt to obtain discovery.
20
While these principles apply to documentary evidence, the rele-
vant sections in the legislation refer to "giving material evidence"
or producing documents "likely to be material evidence." "Mate-
riality" is clearly common to both, and thus oral evidence must
be subject to the same principles.
The principles of the Reading Justices case in relation to a
mutual assistance request were tested in the case of R v. Bow
Street Magistrates' Court ex parte King and Another 2 ' the Don King
case, the facts of which were recited at the start of this Essay. In
19. Rv. ReadingJustices exparte Berkshire County Council, 1 Crim. App. Rep. 239,
247 (Q.B. 1996).
20. Id.
21. R v. Bow Street Magistrates Court ex parte King and Another, Unreported CO/
3489/97 (Q.B. 1997).
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the case itself, the magistrate declined to give effect to the letter
of request. The decision was challenged by the applicants
through judicial review in the High Court.
After considering the facts of the Don King case and recit-
ing the relevant provisions of Schedule 1 of the 1990 Act, the
High Court Judge, Collins J, stated:
It is clear from those provisions that the English court
(the Stipendiary Magistrate in this case) has to consider,
when faced with an application which involves the production
of documents, any claim made by a person that he does not
have to produce the documents as if the proceedings were
domestic English criminal proceedings. Thus, English law
and English considerations must apply.
... it seems to me quite unarguable that even in para. 4(1) (a)
proceedings the court has to consider the admissibility or the
compellability, to put it in its precise terms, of the material in
the foreign proceedings...
The Stipendiary Magistrate was, in my judgment, clearly
correct to approach this matter on the basis of what English
law would have allowed. That means, as was the case here,
that in certain circumstances a request made by a foreign
court may not be met, but that stems from the form in which
this particular legislation is enacted. The English court can
only, of course, apply the law as laid down by Parliament in
this particular Act.2 2
The judge then drew attention to the principles set out by
Simon Brown, LJ in R v. Reading Justices ex parte Berkshire County
Council23 and proceeded to apply those rules of admissibility to
the request:
As I say, I am wholly satisfied that if this were English law,
those documents could not be admissible for the purpose of
construing the contract or for the purpose of discovering
what the relevant words meant.
I appreciate that the law in the United States appears to be
different. It may be, although objections, of course, have
been made... and I assume for the moment that that evi-
dence will be admitted before the jury for the purpose of es-
22. Id.
23. ex parte Berkshire County Counci 1 Crim. App. Rep. 239.
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tablishing what the prosecution say is the true meaning of this
expression. One can well understand the Applicants' con-
cern that this is potentially unfair because they are not able to
get their hands, they say, on material which could show that
what the witnesses said is not right. That is a matter, I am
afraid, which I cannot take into account in deciding upon ad-
missibility and, more importantly, it is a matter which the
Magistrate could not take into account.
2 4
While the judge ruled that it was not a matter that he had to
decide in terms, he indicated that, were he sitting at first in-
stance on the material before him, he would have found it diffi-
cult to be persuaded prima facie that the exercise was nothing
more than disguised discovery. Accordingly, leave to move for
judicial review was refused.
Despite such practical problems, the defendant in foreign
proceedings who requests assistance from the United Kingdom
has to clear the same hurdles as a foreign prosecutor, whom par-
adoxically are treated better than prosecutors from the United
Kingdom.
Section 4 of the 1990 Act introduces for the first time into
the English criminal process the concept of a U.K. court under-
taking an investigatory function. The court is being used to col-
lect evidence, a concept more familiar in civil than in common
law jurisdictions. This anomaly provides international investiga-
tors (and defendants) requesting evidence from the United
Kingdom with powers which, in some circumstances, exceed
those available to U.K. officers in domestic investigations. A
practical example in relation to foreign investigators will serve to
illustrate.
If a foreign agency (for example, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (or "FBI")) is investigating allegations of dishon-
esty by its citizens and has information that funds have been
transferred by a suspect to an account held by a third party in
the United Kingdom, the agency will seek to trace the funds.
The third party, however, may have passed all the papers relating
to the transaction to his accountant to sort out his tax position.
The FBI will initially seek informal access to the accountant's
records, but this may be resisted. In those circumstances, a for-
mal letter of request can be issued by the U.S. authorities. In
24. ex parte King and Another, supra note 21.
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due course, a court will be nominated under Section 4 of the
1990 Act (most usually a magistrates court), and the accountant
will be subpoenaed to the court to produce his files and give
related evidence.
In a domestic investigation, the situation is entirely differ-
ent, and obtaining the evidence of the accountant is far more
complicated. At the investigation stage, no U.K. court has au-
thority to compel a person to give evidence or to produce evi-
dence (other than by such coercive measures as search warrants,
in which event safeguards exist). There are, after all, no pro-
ceedings. The investigators must therefore rely upon their
search and seizure powers.
The accountant's papers are "special procedure material"25
and in normal circumstances only a senior judge in the Crown
Court (not a magistrate as in the example given above) can or-
der production of the papers, and only:
(a) after an inter partes hearing (unless it is suggested that the
accountant may seek to destroy the file); and
(b) upon being satisfied that the material is likely to be
(i) of substantial value (whether by itself or together with
other material) to the investigation;
(ii) relevant; and
(iii) in the public interest having regard to the benefit
likely to accrue to the investigation and to the circum-
stances under which the person in possession of the
material holds it; and
(c) if one or other of the access conditions has been satisfied.26
There is a heavy burden placed upon the police to submit to the
Crown Court judge detailed information that is as precise and
complete as possible, in order to enable him to perform the bal-
ancing process properly.
Earl Ferrers argued about these procedures to the House of
Lords during the Bill stage of the 1990 Act. He stated that how-
ever much the Government wished to assist other countries, it
could not allow Parliament to make greater powers available on
behalf of overseas authorities than are available to U.K. police or
25. SeePolice & Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), 1984, ch. 60 §14 (defining "special
procedure material").
26. Id. Schedule 1.
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prosecuting authorities in domestic cases. 7 These were lofty
but, eventually, empty sentiments.
IV. OUTGOING REQUESTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
FOR EVIDENCE
Section 3 of the 1990 Act covers the general application pro-
cedure that U.K. authorities must follow to obtain evidence from
abroad. The relevant parts of Section 3 of the 1990 Act are as
follows:
3(1) Where on an application made in accordance with sub-
section (2) below it appears to a justice of peace or a
judge-
(a) that an offence has been committed or that there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an of-
fence has been committed; and
(b) that proceedings in respect of the offence have
been instituted or that the offence is being investi-
gated, he may issue a letter ("a letter of request")
requesting assistance in obtaining outside the
United Kingdom such evidence as is specified in
the letter for use in the proceedings or investiga-
tion.
(2) An application under subsection (1) above may be made
by a prosecuting authority or, if proceedings have been insti-
tuted, by the person charged in those proceedings.
(3) A prosecuting authority which is for the time being desig-
nated for the purposes of this section by an order made
by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument may it-
self issue a letter of request if
(a) it is satisfied as to the matters mentioned in subsec-
tion (1)(a) above; and
(b) the offence in question is being investigated or the
authority has instituted proceedings in respect of it.
(4) Subject to subsection (5) below, a letter of request shall
be sent to the Secretary of State for transmission either-
(a) to a court or tribunal specified in the letter and exer-
cising jurisdiction in the place where the evidence is
to be obtained; or
(b) to any authority recognized by the government of
the country or territory in question as the appropri-
27. 513 PARU. DEB., H.L. (Official Rep.) 1217 (1989).
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ate authority for receiving requests for assistance of
the kind to which this section applies.
(5) In cases of urgency a letter of request may be sent direct
to such a court or tribunal as is mentioned in subsection
(4) (a) above.
(6) In this section "evidence" includes documents and other
articles.
(7) Evidence obtained by virtue of a letter of request shall
not without the consent of such authority as is men-
tioned in subsection (4) (b) above be used for any pur-
pose other than that specified in the letter; and when any
document or other article obtained pursuant to a letter
of request is no longer required for that purpose (or for
any other purpose for which such consent has been ob-
tained), it shall be returned to such an authority unless
that authority indicates that the document or article
need not be returned.
(8) In exercising the discretion conferred by section 25 of
the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (exclusion of evidence
otherwise admissible) in relation to a statement con-
tained in evidence taken pursuant to a letter of request
the court shall have regard
(a) to whether it was possible to challenge the statement
by questioning the person who made it; and
(b) if proceedings have been instituted, to whether the
local law allowed the parties to the proceedings to be
legally represented when the evidence was taken.
28
The first three subsections make it clear that there are two
categories of people entitled to issue a letter of request for evi-
dence to be obtained from abroad. The first, under subsection
(1), is a judge. A judge makes the request on application by
either the prosecuting authority, or, if proceedings have been
instituted, the person charged in those proceedings. The second cate-
gory (under sub-section (3)) is that of "a prosecuting authority
which is for the time being designated for the purposes of this
sub-section" who is entitled to issue the letter of request himself.
A Designation Order29 has been made in respect to various
prosecutors, including the Attorney General for England &
28. 1990 Act, supra note 1, § 3 (emphasis added).
29. See id at Schedule 2 § 3(3) (Designation of Prosecuting Authorities) (1991)
(implementing effectively Declaration 3 of U.K. Government in accordance with Article
24 of European Convention of Mutual Assistance of 1959).
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Wales, the Director of Public Prosecutions and any Crown Prose-
cutor, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, any person des-
ignated under Section 1(7) of The CriminalJustice Act of 1987,
and the Secretary of State for Trade & Industry." All of these
individuals or groups of individuals are, therefore, entitled to
make requests. Requests by designated prosecuting authorities
are by far the most common type of requests made.
V. DEFENSE REQUEST TO THE COURT FOR THE
ISSUE OF A REQUEST UNDER SECTION 3(1):
"TIE PERSON CHARGED"
An application may be made by a person "charged in those
proceedings," according to Section 3(2). 31 Thus, a defendant
may make an application via the court for a letter of request to
be issued, but only after proceedings have been instituted
against him or her. He or she may make such an application at
any stage of the proceedings after charge. In particular, he or
she may make an application during the trial process itself. The
procedure is thus not available to a potential defendant, who
may be seeking to dissuade a prosecuting authority from com-
mencing proceedings. Further, it follows from the statutory pro-
visions detailed above, that the defendant cannot issue himself
or herself a letter of request in the same way that the designated
prosecuting authority is able to do.
Applications by or on behalf of the person charged are not
yet frequently made, but it is an important facility that the de-
fense has, and should not be overlooked. If, following an appli-
cation made on behalf of the person charged to a justice of the
peace orjudge, the justice of the peace or judge refuses to issue
a letter of request, then the defense may appeal this decision.
There is no statutory provision for such procedure, but the mat-
ter would, it is submitted, be subject to appeal in the same way as
any other ruling.
VI. HOW ARE UK DEFENDANTS FARNG IN THEIR EFFORTS
TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE ABROAD?
In the case of Forsyth,3 2 there was an application under Sec-
30. Id.
31. Id. § 3(2).
32. R v. Forsyth, 2 Crim. App. Rep. 299 (Q.B. 1997).
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tion 3(2) of the 1990 Act, made on behalf of the defendant dur-
ing the course of the trial. The case was appealed on other
grounds, and the judgement in the Court of Appeal does not
concern this point. The application asked the trial judge to issue
a letter of request (in this case, the hearing of witnesses by televi-
sion link) requesting assistance from the authorities in the Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The judge summarized the
matter as follows:
Since 1983 the so-called Turkish Republic of northern Cyprus
has not been recognised by the United Kingdom, nor by any
other country except for Turkey itself. Thus it is impossible
to obtain extradition of any fugitive from justice from north-
ern Cyprus. The fact of non-recognition seems to me to pres-
ent an insuperable obstacle to the issue of a letter of request
since by section 3(4) such a letter has to be sent to the Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department of Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment for transmission to the court of northern Cyprus.
The Secretary of State would be unable and unwilling to com-
ply with that requirement since to do so would necessarily im-
ply recognition of the so-called Turkish Republic of northern
Cyprus. Mr. Robertson (on behalf of the defendant) has sub-
mitted that there are a number of respects in which the au-
thorities of the United Kingdom and of northern Cyprus co-
operate with each other not least in certain investigations
made by the Serious Fraud Office in this or in an associated
case. He urges me to take the view that it would not amount
to recognition for me to write to a judge in northern Cyprus
but in my opinion this Act does not envisage the writing of
letters on that basis, and does not empower me to do so. In
my view the provisions of the Criminal Justice (International
Co-operation) Act 1990 do not extend to the requesting of
assistance in obtaining evidence from states which are not
recognised by the United Kingdom. Accordingly I have no
jurisdiction to grant the application and I therefore refuse
it. 33
The decision to refuse the application on behalf of the de-
fense was thus made on the somewhat unusual ground that the
country where the evidence was sought was not recognized by
Her Majesty's Government. The merits or otherwise of the ap-
plication were not considered. In most cases, U.K. courts will try
33. Id.
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to accede to defense applications to obtain evidence from
abroad, wherever this is possible in accordance with the statutory
provisions.
Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Forsyth stated that:
In general, once it is shown that there is difficulty in ob-
taining the attendance of witnesses abroad whose evidence is
relevant to the defense, we consider the court should lean in
favour of permitting evidence to be given in this way, though
in particular cases, there may be reasons to refuse it. 4
The reasoning in Forsyth appears to ignore the two stage process
involved in seeking mutual assistance:
a) the issue of the letter of request-the duty of the court
and; [Section 3(1)]
b) the transmission of the letter of request-the duty of the
Secretary of State. [Section 3(4)].
The court has a discretion; it "may" issue a letter if it appears
that an offense has been committed, or that there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that it has, and that proceedings have been
instituted.
In Forsyth, both conditions were clearly satisfied. One would
expect the court to issue the letter and, in accordance with Sec-
tion 3(4) of the 1990 Act, to send it to the U.L Secretary of State
for transmission. Then, the U.L Secretary of State must trans-
mit the letter either to a court or tribunal specified in the letter
or to any authority recognized in the requested state as the ap-
propriate authority for receiving such requests. The question
mark over the recognition or otherwise of the "so-called Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus" was a matter for the U.K. Secre-
tary of State rather than the court. It is interesting to note that
the U.K. Secretary of State appears to have no discretion under
Section 3(4). The defendant's position is inextricably linked
with the legal and procedural parameters of the jurisdiction
from which assistance is sought. The problems that arise for
U.K. defendants will reflect the contrasts between these jurisdic-
tions.
34. 1&
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VII. U.S. MECHANISMS
Of considerable use to the U.K. defendant who requests evi-
dence from the United States, and of particular interest in the
context of the Fordham International Criminal Law Symposium, is
the availability of Section 1782 of the U.S. Code for the defend-
ant in U.K. proceedings.' 5 In the United Kingdom, applications
can only be made by or on behalf of the defendant under the
1990 Act when he is charged. The situation may be different,
however, if the evidence that an actual or potential defendant
seeks is in the United States. In those circumstances, the appli-
cant may be able to use the provisions of Section 1782 of the
U.S. Code to seek to obtain the evidence at an earlier stage.
Section 1782, which was revised by U.S. Congress in 1964 to
liberalize U.S. "procedures for assisting foreign... tribunals and
litigants in obtaining oral and documentary evidence in the
United States," 36 states:
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides
or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement
or to produce a document or other thing for use in a pro-
ceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including crim-
inal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The
order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or
request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon
the application of any interested person and may direct that
the testimony or statement be given, or the document or
other thing being produced, before a person appointed by
the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person ap-
pointed has power to administer any necessary oath and take
the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the
practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part prac-
tice and procedure of the foreign country or the interna-
tional tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or pro-
ducing the document or other thing. To the extent that the
order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or state-
ment shall be taken, and the document or other thing pro-
duced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2000).
36. S. REP. No. 88-1580, § 9 (1964).
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statement or to produce a document or other thing in viola-
tion of any legally applicable privilege.
(b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the
United States from voluntarily giving his testimony or state-
ment, or producing a document or other thing, for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any
person and in any manner acceptable to him.3 7
In effect, Section 1782 permits a U.S. federal court to order
U.S.-style discovery for use in international proceedings. This
section is the normal vehicle by which corporations or individu-
als involved, or about to become involved, in international arbi-
tration or litigation request that a potential witness in the United
States provide statements or produce documents for use in those
proceedings. It has also been used in criminal proceedings and,
in some cases, in criminal investigations. Letters rogatory in aid
of foreign criminal proceedings are authorized. The Crown
Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom is "an interested per-
son" within the meaning of the federal statute governing foreign
applications for judicial assistance.3 8
It is not necessary for proceedings to have been commenced
before an application under Section 1782 may be granted. The
various circuits, however, have applied different tests, both to
"discoverability" and also to imminence of proceedings. For in-
stance in In re Request For International Judicial Assistance (Letter Ro-
gatory) for the Federative Republic of Brazil, et. al.,39 it was held that
the district court may order production of evidence pursuant to
a foreign government's letter rogatory in the absence of pending
adjudicative proceedings. This applies only if such proceedings
are imminent, that is they are very likely to occur within a brief
interval from the request. It is not sufficient that adjudicative
proceedings are merely probable.
In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Service of United
Kingdom4° held that British criminal proceedings need not be
pending in order for the Crown Prosecution Service to request
assistance in a criminal investigation. Rather, it was sufficient
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (a)-(b) (1994).
38. In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Service of the United King-
dom, 870 F.2d 686, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
39. In re Request For International Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the
Federative Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991).
40. In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Seroice 870 F.2d at 686.
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that judicial proceedings were within reasonable contemplation.
In the same case, it was held that the lack of pending judicial
proceedings did not prohibit the U.S. District Court, under Sec-
don 1782, from ordering a U.S. national to give deposition testi-
mony. The U.S. District Court also had the power to order a
U.S. national to provide documents to assist U.K authorities dur-
ing a criminal perversion of justice investigation upon applica-
tion via a letter rogatory.
It was held in the application of In Re Asta Medica, S.A., 4
that, in determining whether an interested person has estab-
lished that the information sought would be discoverable in the
international jurisdiction, the district court need not explore
whether the information being sought by the applicant would be
admissible in the United States. Further, courts have held that
witnesses cannot object to a district court's action in issuing sub-
poenas in response to letters rogatory on the grounds that the
testimony to be taken might not be admissible in the trial in the
other country.4
2
The procedure by which an "interested person" initiates a
request under Section 1782 depends upon the circuit in which
the request is sought. A request generally comprises a brief ex
parte application, which is accompanied by a copy of the pro-
posed order and the memorandum of the appropriate law. The
U.S. court will issue the subpoena or other order, which may be
challenged according to the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
A witness in the United States, who is subpoenaed in rela-
tion to a U.S. investigation, cannot rely upon any statute provid-
ing that a person before an international tribunal cannot be
compelled to give testimony or to produce documents in viola-
tion of any legally applicable privilege.43 Clearly, the prospects
of success of any such application will depend upon the circuit
in which the proposed witness resides. They will also depend
upon technical questions of U.S. law and procedure. Obviously,
any applicant in such circumstances should seek advice from
specialist U.S. counsel.
41. In reAsta Medica, SA, 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
42. In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo District, Tokyo, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir.
1976).
43. In re Mr. and Mrs. Doe, Witnesses Before the Grand Jury, 860 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.
1988).
Section 1782 is available as an alternative to the letters roga-
tory route, and it has clear advantages of speed and broader ap-
plicability for actual and potential defendants. This procedure is
equally available to a prosecutor or investigator as "interested
persons." Since the prosecutor or investigator can issue a letter
of request at any stage of the U.K. investigation, Section 1782 is
unlikely to offer advantages over the U.K. statutory route, unless,
of course, severe delay is anticipated.
CONCLUSION
Within the field of mutual assistance, the United Kingdom
is very much one of the "new kids on the block." The United
Kingdom only effectively joined the club in 1990, and thus exam-
ples of defense requests and the problems they met are limited.
Problems between the United Kingdom and other common law
jurisdictions, including the United States and members of the
Commonwealth, will be easier to predict and thereby to resolve.
It is the requests involving civil law jurisdictions, which have al-
ready started to highlight problems, some of which may indeed
impact U.K. proceedings to such an extent that they may them-
selves be threatened.
In the early days under the 1990 Act, defense requests to
civil law jurisdictions (and others, such as Islamic law jurisdic-
tions) commonly disappeared into the ether. Once they were
transmitted, nothing was heard of them again. Thankfully,
things have moved apace and at least requests are now being
answered. The problems, however, have not disappeared.
In a recent case involving Denmark, D was charged in the
United Kingdom with offenses of international drug trafficking.
It was additionally alleged that he was involved with another U.K.
citizen, A, who was in custody in Denmark. Evidence of continu-
ous contact between D and A was relied upon by both sets of
prosecutors. Itwas D's defense in the U.K. proceedings that tele-
phone calls were made in order to contact his former girlfriend,
the mother of his children. D's U.K. lawyers sought to interview
A in Denmark before deciding whether to call him as a witness.
A's lawyers agreed. Under Danish law, however, it was necessary
to seek the authority of the Danish police to question A. The
police insisted that the request had to be made officially to the
Danish authorities by the U.K. authorities. This was done, and
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three months later D's English lawyers received a telephone call
from the Danish police insisting that before any interview took
place, they needed to see a complete list of all questions that
would be put to A. Whether they granted permission would de-
pend upon those questions. Similarly, they required full details
of D's girlfriend and children, including their address and tele-
phone number. Furthermore, they stated that D's English law-
yer would not be allowed to interview A alone; Danish police and
English Customs & Excise (the authority prosecuting D in the
United Kingdom) would also have to be present. Without prior
permission from the police, no interview would take place.
This telephone call was followed up by a letter from the
prosecutor (in Danish) formally imposing these conditions. Un-
derstandably, the U.K. lawyers questioned the necessity for such
conditions and drew attention to potential breaches of Article 6
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guaran-
tees adequate facilities in the preparation of an accused's de-
fense.' It was pointed out to the Danes that in the United King-
dom this would entitie the defense to interview potential defense
witnesses privately. Since A was not a witness proposed to be
called by the U.K. prosecutors, the police would not in the
United Kingdom be entitled to be present during any interview
of him. It was further pointed out that the requirement to sup-
ply details of the girlfriend and his children appeared to infringe
the defendant's right to privacy under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.4" This prompted the prosecutor
to refuse the interview, thereby denying D the right to interview
a potential defense witness.
The decision was appealed. The senior public prosecutor
reversed his subordinate's decision but imposed the same condi-
tions as before, plus an additional condition that the questioning
of A be done by the Danish police and not by D's U.K. lawyers.
In fact, the problem was side-stepped by the U.K. lawyers when
they sought A's attendance as a witness in the United Kingdom
under Section 6 of the 1990 Act and Article 11 of the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 1959.
They effectively called him "blind."
44. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
45. Id. art. 8.
DEFENSE REQUESTS
This case eloquently demonstrates two potent sources of in-
equality of arms/opportunity. First, the U.K. investigators and
prosecutors had been allowed unimpeded and unaccompanied
access to A earlier. Of more importance was the threat to fair-
ness in the U.K. proceedings by denying D "full and unimpeded
access" to potential witnesses. In the case of Connolly v. Dale,4"
the applicant was charged with murder. While seeking to sub-
stantiate their client's alibi, the lawyers employed a private inves-
tigator to identify potential witnesses at a men's hostel. The in-
vestigator was prevented from interviewing residents and staff or
showing them the accused's photograph. The police threatened
to prosecute the lawyer and the investigator for obstructing the
police in the execution of their duty. The court held that inter-
ference with witnesses, actual or potential, amounted to con-
tempt of court. Interference with a lawyer in the discharge of his
duties could also constitute contempt. The police, therefore,
had no right to stop and approach potential witnesses. Their
threat to take action with the intention of preventing the de-
fendant's solicitor from having full and unimpeded access to
such witnesses was a clear contempt of court.
While the jurisdiction for contempt of court is unlikely to
run outside the United Kingdom, it does amount to an interfer-
ence with the due course of justice. This may itself invoke an
application from the defense that to continue the trial would
amount to an abuse of the court's process. If the course ofjus-
tice is so interfered, then it is unfair to try the accused if he is the
victim of interference. If it is unfair, then there should not be a
trial; fairness must be assessed objectively according to U.K. prin-
ciples and with reference to the result of the interference.
There would be no need to prove mala fides on the part of the
Danish authorities. If a defendant's right to a fair trial is
breached, it "must inevitably result in the conviction being
quashed."
4 7
The Human Rights Act of 1998 is designed to
give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under
the European Convention on Human Rights... securing to
everyone within the jurisdiction of the UK the fundamental
46. Connoly v. Dale; 1 Crim. App. Rep. 200 (Q.B. 1996).
47. The right to a fair trial "is a fundamental constitutional right recognised by the
common law." DPP ex parte Kebilene, 3 W.L.R. 188 (Q.B. 1999).
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values and rights that are entrenched in binding interna-
tional law by the UK's ratification of the Convention and
membership of the Council of Europe.4 8
It will come fully into force in October 2000. Hopefully, it will
strengthen the defendant's rights to a fair trial in his own juris-
diction.
48. LoRD LEsTER & DAVID PANNcC, HuMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRAcancE (Butterworths
ed., 1999).
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